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Pryor and Buchanan (1984), using participants drawn from jury venires, showed that 
persons exhibiting a moderately anxious demeanour were found guilty more often than 
those with a low anxiety demeanour when evidence presented was balanced. In a study 
that used three levels of evidence (prowacquittal, balanced and pro-conviction) and two 
levels of demeanour (apparently deceptive and control) Hendry, Schaffer and Peacock 
( 1989) found that the demeanour bias only occurred at the pro-acquittal level of 
evidence. They had not used a criminal offence and did not provide judges instructions. 
Additionally conviction rates at all levels of evidence in the control condition when 
demeanour was manipulated increased substantially indicating that evidence levels were 
all being treated as prowconvictioE. The present study \Vas designed to replicate the study 
by Pryor and Buchanan and extend it to the three levels of evidence used by Hendry, et 
a!. Participants were 120 (69 female, 51 male. mean age M = 38.76)jury eligible 
members of the general population randomly allocated as mock jurors to a 2 x 3 
(demeanour x evidence) experimental factorial design. The two levels of demeanour 
were low anxiety and moderate anxiety while the three levels of evidence were pro-
acquittal, balanced and prowconviction. Log linear analysis was performed on 
dichotomous guilty I not guilty verdicts. The analysis ended with a significant overatl 
model ~2 (4. N ~ 120) ~ 5.32, u ~ .256 this indicated the data was a good fit to the 
model. The interactions that remained as significant contributors to the model were 
verdict x evidence LR ~2 (2, N~ 120) ~ 29.2. u < .0000), and verdict x demeanour 
LR ~2 (I, N ~ 120) ~ 11.18. u ~ .0008). Because all variables were entered together they 
constitute main effects for evidence and demeanour. These results showed that persons 
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exhibiting a moderately anxious demeanour were found guilty more often across all 
levels of evidence than pe:sons exhibiting a low anxiety demeanour. 
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I 
Trial by jury as a right rather than a privilege was provided by the Magna Carta in 
1251 (Forbes & Sommer, 1972). Originally juries were made up of local men who 
would be expected to know the accused. The juries' task was to "say the truth" based on 
their knowledge of the accused and local affairs. When you know someone and are 
aware of their everyday demeanour and how they cope in stressful situations it is likely 
you will be able to tell ifthey are being deceptive. The Latin word used in these early 
trials was verdiction meaning "truly said". This early function of the jury is reflected in 
the modern term verdict. The law has undergone many complex changes over the 
centuries, and from these rules have evolved regarding procedure and t!vidence (Forbes 
& Sommer). Many of these have contributed to the current central policy concern that 
innocents must not be convicted (Law Reform Commission, 1985). 
Due processes of the law, its rules and procedures, are considered to address this 
concern. The judge's function is to maintain these rules and procedures and decide on 
points oflaw. Whilst the modern juror is required to develop an understanding of these 
procedural limitations, particularly with regard to evidence, that may arise during a trial. 
It is required of jurors that they learn to work within these restraints and also be able to 
dismiss biases that may arise. An additional difficulty for a juror is that they are not 
usually allowed to make notes and do not receive transcripts of the proceedings. Thus 
they must depend on memory. The law recognises that in these circumstances it is 
possible that jurors will turn to sources of information other than the facts of the case 
presented and admitted. "We all develop some opinions based upon observations that we 
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do not consciously apprehend, and therefore, cannot describe. Opinions of another 
person's character are of this kind" (Law Reform Commission, 1985, p.218). A concern 
of the current legal system is that indications of bad character are not admitted as 
evidence. To counter this a rule of evidence is that, generally, evidence of a person· s bad 
character should not be admissible as it can extend beyond the facts of the case. 
Wigmore, who is quoted by the Law Reform Commission, illustrates this. "The deep 
tendency of human natu,·e to punish, not because our victim is guilty this time, but 
because he (sic) is a bad man and may as well be condemned now that he is caught, is 
a tendency that ca.tnot fail to operate with any jury, in or out of the court." (Law Rdorm 
Commission, i 985, p.445). The changes over the centuries have meant that today jurors 
are considered to be "triers of fact" who preferably have no personal knowledge of the 
accused. The "trier of fact" has never seen the accused before the trial and is u.naware of 
the person's normal demeanour. The "trier of fact" is also ignorant of how the accused 
will behave when under stress. 
Pryor and Buchanan ( 1984) have suggested that jurors could mistake behavioural 
cues caused by stress, for cues that suggest a deceitful demeanour. Kelley (1950) 
provided a possible reason fnr this misinterpretation. K.clley was able to demonstrate that 
any behavioural information, gained about a person through observation, was 
consistently interpreted in light of the original evaluation made of that person. In 
Kelley's study the original evaluation was based on knowledge that the person had either 
a warm or a cold character. It would follow from this that the initial impression of a 
person charged with a serious crime could effect the interpretation of subsequent 
non-verbal behavioural cues. 
Trial by anxiery 
3 
Ekman (1992) speculates that identifying deceitful behaviour still remains an 
integral part of the function of trial by jury and both judges' and jurors' benefit from 
seeing the way that the accused person presents him or herself. The question then arises; 
can a mock juror reliably identify deceit? If deceit can consistently be identified from 
behaviour then this ability would remain an important function of trial by jury. If not 
then it is possible a bias is created against those whose behaviour is mistakenly 
considered to be deceitful. In I98l Pryor and Leone identified six behaviours that lay 
people associate with lying or deceptive communication. These were lack of eye contact, 
speech errors, back\vard lean, trunk swivel, excessive leg movement and body rocking. 
Burgess ( 1987) identified these same behaviours as signs of nervous demeanour in 
public speakers. Burgess further identified fidgeting or restricted movement, word 
repetition, loss of pitch control and hesitation of speech followed by a rapid delivery as 
other behaviours that indicate a nervous demeanour to an audience. 
Hess and Kleck (1994) investigating facial behaviour have shown that 
individuals do consider they can tell if a target person is lying, and that individuals can 
accurately report the behaviours they use to rate a targets' honesty or dishonesty. Hess 
and Kleck concentrated on facial cues in their study. They secretly filmed a genuine 
expression of happiness or disgust while a subject was reliving an experience or when 
participants were shown video materials that had been previously demonstrated to elicit 
reliably happy and disgust responses. They also asked participants to pose episodes of 
happiness or disgust. Other participants who were presented with posed and spontaneous 
episodes differentiated between the episodes at a level no better than chance. Ekman and 
0' Sullivan (1991) and Littlepage and Pineault (1978) also found that observers could 
not det~ct deception, at a level greater than chance, whilst viewing an interviewees facial 
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expressions. Prior to their main study Hess and Kleck provided participants with 
photographs of target persons to be rated as having either honest or dishonest faces. 
During the main study participants considered those they had picked as honest as 
continuing to be honest even when posing. These studies suggest that observers 
considering facial behaviour can report accurately and consistently the cues they use to 
differentiate real from posed expressions. However observers using these cues identify 
the expressions at levels no better than chance and are subject to impression formation 
(Kelley, 1950) induced demeanour biases. 
Another area that is considered to provide cues to deception is the pitch and tone 
of voice. Zuckerman, DeFrank, Hall, Larrance and Roseenthal (1979) secretly recorded 
participants' spontaneous facial expression whilst they were either truthful!y or 
deceptively providing answers to questions such as "what is your attitude toward the 
legalisation of Marijuana?" In a subsequent posed situation the participants were asked 
to answer the same question but now communicate with their facial expression that they 
were telling the truth in the truthful situation or that they were being deceptive in the 
deceptive situ:~ti0r Zuckerman et al. then produced audio only presentations where 
content was masked electronically to make its meaning unintelligible whilst maintaining 
tonal and pitch quality. When participants were being spontaneously deceptive, the mean 
accuracy based on vocal cues was significantly below chance at M-= .476. However, 
when participants used vocal cues to signal they were being deceptive accuracy rose 
significantly above chance (M = .535). The ability to identify spontaneous honest 
behaviour from signalled honest behaviour produced means whose values were 
significantly above chance (M-= .56, and .590) respectively. This indicated a sharing of 
the meaning of these cues by participants but not an ability to detect deceit when it was 
Trial by anxiety 
5 
hidden. This experiment by Zuckerman et al (1979). indicated it is unlikely that a juror 
would be able to detect deception from the pitch or tone of voice at levels above chance. 
Porter and Yuille (1996) identified 18 verbal indicators that people use as an 
identification of deception. These were; amount of detail supplied, coherence, 
spontaneous reproduction, unexpected complications, unusual details, peripheral details, 
related external associations, a subjective mental state, spontane0us corrections, 
admitting lack of memory, verbal hedges, self~referenccs, number of words used, 
pauses, unnecessary connectors, pronoun deviations, component elements and lexical 
diversity. In their experiment Porter and Yuille told participants they should go to a 
certain office and retrieve a file for their professor, but to test the security system they 
were to avoid being seen. A second group of participants were told to go to a certain 
office, unseen, search it and find a $100 note that was hidden there. Upon return they 
were told that as a final test of security they would be interviewed by the new security 
officer regarding the theft of a $1 00 note from the office. They were either instructed to 
tell the truth, practice partial deception, provide a false alibi, or provide a truthful alibi in 
the case of those sent for the envelope. All participants were offered a $5 bonus if they 
could convince the interrogator that they were reporting truthfully. From this design 
some participants were actually being honest and some actually being deceptive. It could 
be argued however that these participants were still really only pretending to be 
deceptive and they had no real motive to hide any deception. Expetts, trained to identify 
the 18 behaviours thought to predict deception, then analysed the interrogations. Porter 
and Yuille found that only three of the eighteen behaviours significantly differentiated 
truthful from deceptive accounts. These three were the amount of detail reported, level 
of coherence, and admitting a lack of memory. The studies discussed have confirmed 
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that jurors are unable to accurately identify deceitful behaviour using non-verbal cues. 
As far &:J the law is concerned, if the juror has considered only the legally admissible 
evidence there is not a problem. Psychologists have shown that jurors may usc some 
evaluations based on non-verbal behaviours or characteristics in conjunction with 
admissible evidence to arrive at decisions. These evaluations are known by 
psychologists as extra legal biases (MacCoun, 1990). 
A meta analysis by Mazzella and Feingold (1994) identi_fied 80 North American 
studies that showed the decision reached by mock juror-; can become different when 
extra legal biases are present. As discussed previously, decisions by juries should be 
reached exdusivcly from admissible evidence that has been presented during the course 
of the trial. The meta analysis of extra legal biases by Mazzella and Fiengold suggests, 
however. that personal attributes such as the race, physical appearance, socioeconomic 
status or gender of the accused may affect a mock jurors' decision. Mazzella and 
Fiengold have speculated that these factors often covary with criminality. They pointed 
out that blacks, the poor, and the unattractive are over represented among perpetrators of 
crime in North America. Therefore jurors may consider these factors relevant indicators 
of criminality even though they may be unaware of the process of ~valuation they used 
in arriving at their decision. As previously discussed evaluating the non-verbal 
behaviours of an accused person who is under stress may lead to the mistaken belief that 
the person is deceitful. 
In Florida USA ju1ors are often instructed by the judge to evaluate the 
demeanuur of an accused person to decide what weight to give to lwr I his testimony. 
Pryor and Buchanan (1984) approached jury venires and asked them to participate in a 
study on the use of technology in the legal system. Participants were told they would be 
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testing whether pre-recorded cross-examinations could be used in the court system. The 
mock jurors were to provide a verdict regarding the offence of breaking and entering a 
drug store with intent to commit a felon". The evidence was presented to the mock 
jurors by giving them ten minutes to read a two-page summary of the case. Two pages of 
evidence that contained the arguments for the prosecution and the defence were then 
provided. After mock jurors had read these materials they viewed a videotape that used a 
stationary camera to show the full face and torso of the accused as he answered 
questions from both defence and prosecuting lawyers. Lawyers were heard but not seen 
by mock jurors. The evidence presented to mock jurors was circumstantial and a matter 
of identity, that is, was it the accused who committed a known crime? Evidence had 
previously been pilot tested on a different group of participants it was found to provide a 
50% conviction rate and thus defined as balanced. The evidence was not manipulated 
during the videotape; rather the videotape was used to manipulate the demeanour of the 
accused. Written judges instructions were provided to mock jurors just prior to them 
making a decision. 
Four levels of demeanour were provided. The first of these was a control 
condition where mock jurors simply read the written evidence and did not view the 
videotape. The other three involved viewing the videotape at different levels of anxious 
demeanour. These three levels were achieved by varying the number of non-verbal 
behaviours that occurred. Three types of non-verbal behaviours were used. These were 
bodily self-manipulation, eye contact, and speech non-fluencies. The length of time the 
accused spent in self-manipulation varied from 2 seconds in the low anxiety condition, 
to 30 seconds in the moderate anxiety condition, and 190 seconds in the high anxiety 
condition. The amount of time the accused maintained eye contact with the camera was 
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varied from 154 seconds in the low anxiety condition, to 84 seconds in the moderate 
anxiety condition and 12 seconds in the high anxiety condition. The number of verbal 
non-fluencies exhibited by the accused varied from 9 in the low anxiety condition, 
to 28 in the moderate anxiety condition and 85 in the high anxiety condition. 
Pryor and Buchan (1984) found a significant main effect for level of guilty 
verdicts, X2(3, N = 145) = 5.81, :Q < .02 which showed that participants who viewed the 
moderate anxiety condition returned more guilty verdicts (25 guilty to 13 not guilty) 
than participants viewing the low anxiety condition (14 guilty to 23 not guilty). No other 
differences were significant. The control level, using vignettes, produced 14 guilty 
to 14 not guilty verdicts and the high anxiety level 20 guilty to 22 not guilty verdicts. 
This study indicates that mock jurors exhibit a bias against an accused with a moderately 
anxious demeanour. 
Hendry, Schaffer and Peacock (1989) performed another study into demeanour. 
Unlike Pryor and Buchanan (1984) Hendry, et al. used introductory psychology 
university students as participants. In contrast to the study by Pryor and Buchanan this 
study did not use a criminal offence, rather participants were told that they would be 
evaluating testimony from a student judiciary hearing. The hearing regarded cheating in 
an exam and the participants were asked to determine if they could reproduce the verdict 
rendered by the officer who had supervised and decided the case. Hendry, et al, did not 
include judge's instructions. 
The evidence was presented to the mock jurors through written transcripts of the 
three witness's testimonies. The participants then viewed videotape of the accused 
providing his version of the facts in a narrative fashion. The evidence was not 
manipulated during the videotape presentation. As with Pryor and Buchanan (1984) only 
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demeanour was manipulated on the video and not the evidence. However, unlike Pryor 
and Buchanan who used four levels of demeanour, Hendry, et al. (1989) manipulated 
only two levels of demeanour. These two levels are similar to those levels termed as low 
and moderate anxiety by Pryor and Buchanan. The expressed aim of the demeanour 
manipulation in the study by Hendry, et al. was different to that used by Pryor and 
Buchanan. The aim of Hendry, et al. was to produce a control demeanour were the 
accused appeared calm and confident and an apparently deceptive demeanour where the 
accused appeared anxious such that the viewer might consider the accused to be less 
truthful and sincere than the control accused. Hendry, et al. Performed one-way 
ANOVA's on two 9-point measures (sincerity and truthfulness). Both revealed 
significant differences in the means for the levels of demeanour (sincerity item 
.E(l, 22) = 11.09, :g < .01 and truthfulness item .E(l, 22) = 23.52, :g < .01). Participants 
considered the accused with the control demeanour more sincere ( M = 5.0) than the 
accused with an apparently deceptive demeanour (M = 3.33) They also considered the 
accused more truthful when exhibiting the control demeanour (M = 5.25) than when 
appearing to be apparently deceptive (M = 2.25). Hendry, et al. considered that the pilot 
studies confirmed that their aim had been achieved. Hendry, et al. had intended that 
participants would be uncertain about the veracity and reliability of the accused shown 
in the control demeanour condition. 
The non-verbal behaviours manipulated were the same as those manipulated by 
Pryor and Buchanan (1984) and were self-manipulation, eye contact, time and frequency 
of verbal non-fluencies. The moderately anxious demeanour manipulation by Pryor and 
Buchanan used 30 seconds self manipulation, 84 seconds eye contact time and 28 
occasions of speech non-fluencies during 181 seconds deposition length. The 
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manipulation that provided an apparently deceptive demeanour for Hendry, et al. (1989) 
contained 6 seconds of self manipulation, greater than 174 seconds of eye contact time 
and 8 speech non-fluencies in a deposition that lasted 180 seconds. Hendry, et al. did not 
state what was happening in the video when these behaviours took place. Hendry, et al. 
did confirm that the accused appeared calm most of the time and experienced periodic 
situational stress. It appears that the difference in the perceived outcomes of participants 
from moderately anxious to apparently deceptive can be explained by the difference in 
volume and timing of the non-verbal behaviours. 
Unlike Pryor and Buchanan (1984) this study manipulated the evidence that was 
provided via the written documentation. Three levels of evidence were presented. 
A balanced level of evidence as used by Pryor and Buchanan, and two other levels that 
were pro-conviction and pro acquittal. Pilot testing by Hendry, et al. (1989) using a 
9-point scale, with a mid-point of 5, produced a significant effect for strength of 
evidence I:(2, 31) = 5.24, Q < .05. Participants were uncertain regarding the guilt of the 
accused in the balanced condition (M = 5.4). In the pro conviction condition participants 
tended to say the accused was guilty (M = 6. 7), and in the pro acquittal condition 
participants favoured not guilty (M = 3.83). Hendry, et al. did not report post hoc test 
results however the means reported indicate the manipulation was successful. The levels 
of evidence as per the written vignettes had been shown in the pilot study to vary as 
expected. However in the experiment with the demeanour manipulation present this was 
no longer the case. Hendry, et al. reported a main effect for strength of evidence as 
marginally significant .E(2, 114) = 2.85, Q < .10. The statistic reported does not indicate a 
significant effect. The means that the statistic was based on are Pro-conviction (M=7.7), 
Balanced (M=7.32), and Pro-acquittal (M=6.93). These means indicate that the evidence 
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manipulation did not function as intended once demeanour was introduced. This 
indicated that, in the opinion of the participants, all the evidence presented in the 
experiment was pro-conviction. The difference in results for the manipulation of 
evidence between the pilot study with a written vignette carried out by Hendry, et al. and 
the results obtained with the demeanour manipulation in the experiment were not 
addressed by Hendry, et al. 
Hendry, et al (1989) provided a possible explanation, for the shift that occurred 
when the demeanour manipulation is introduced, when discussing truthfulness and 
sincerity. During their pilot study, of the perception of truthfulness and sincerity for the 
control demeanour, participants rated means of 5.25 and 5 on a 9-point scale with a 
mid-point of 5. This indicated that participants were not at all sure that this person was 
either truthful or sincere. This being the case it is possible that participants considered 
both treatments of demeanour as deceitful and thus Hendry, et al. measured the same 
condition from two different perspectives. The ice cool deceiver who does nothing to 
give themself away and the not so skilled deceiver whose non-verbal behaviour gives 
him away. By contrast in the Pryor and Buchanan (1984) study the number of 
convictions for low anxiety demeanour drop below the pilot level, from 50% guilty and 
50% not guilty in the pilot study to 37.8% guilty and 62.2% not guilty in the 
experimental condition. Zuckerman et al. (1979) found that when participants sent cues 
that they were being deceitful observers performed at higher levels than chance in 
picking them up. This is essentially what happened in the study by Hendry, et al. (1989). 
The actor was instructed to appear deceitful and sent appropriate signals to the mock 
jurors. This overwhelmed the evidence and the guilt rating, at the pro-acquittal level of 
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evidence, rose from a not guilty vote (M = 3.83) in the pilot study to a guilty vote 
(M = 6.93) in the experimental manipulation. 
Hendry, et al (1989) did not use a guilty/not guilty verdict as the dependent 
variable. They chose as their dependent variable two measures. The first asked for the 
participants' personal impression of the accused probable guilt on a 9-point scale from 
1 = very unlikely guilty; through 5 = uncertain; to 9 = very likely guilty. The second 
asked for their verdict if they were trying this case, again on a 9-point scale from 
1 = definitely do not convict; through 5 = uncertain; to 9 = definitely convict. These two 
measures were found to be highly correlated (r = .88, 12.. < .01 ). MANOV A conducted on 
participants' guilt ratings and verdict recommendations produced three significant 
outcomes: a main effect for strength of evidence, F(4, 226) = 6.75, p <.01; a main effect 
of testimonial demeanour, E(2, 113) = 11.74, Q <.01; and a Strength of Evidence x 
Testimonial Demeanour interaction effect, E(4, 226) = 2.82, Q <.05. Subsequent 
univariate analysis of participants' assessments of the defendant's probable guilt 
produced the same three significant effects that emerged from the MANOV A. The main 
effect for strength of evidence, E(2, 114) = 14.7?, Q <.01, reflects the findings that the 
defendant was judged as more likely guilty in either the pro-conviction evidence 
condition (M = 8.03) than in either the balanced evidence (M = 6.45) or the pro-acquittal 
evidence condition (M = 6.13 ). Examination of the main effect for testimonial 
demeanour, E(l, 114) = 14.68, Q <.01, revealed that participants thought the apparently 
deceptive defendant more likely to be guilty (M = 7.43) than the calmer and more 
confident control defendant (M = 6.03). Hendry, et al found an interaction emerged 
between strength of evidence and demeanour. E(2, 114) = 5.76, Q < .01. Participants 
judged, when the evidence presented was pro-acquittal, that the apparently deceptive 
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accused was more likely guilty (M = 7.45) than the accused with the control demeanour 
(M = 4.8). Demeanour did not have a meaningful effect on participants' assessment of 
the accused when the evidence was balanced or pro-conviction. 
Hendry, et al. (1989) had not provided judges instructions outlining that jurors 
must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt in their verdict. Pfeiffer and Ogloff (1991) 
had shown that these instructions, when included, could be powerful enough to eliminate 
bias caused by the increased saliency of the manipulation due to shortened version of a 
real trial. Hendry, et al. chose to use cheating at a university make up exam rather than a 
criminal offence. Kaplan (1994) considers that the higher the severity of punishment that 
can be received for an offence the more likely it is that a juror will provide a not guilty 
verdict given the same amount of evidence. The Law Reform Commission ( 1985) 
considers that the more heinous the offence the more evidence required by jurors to 
enter a guilty verdict. This suggests that had Hendry, et al given judges instructions and 
used a criminal offence the participants may have been more reluctant to find the 
accused guilty. 
Both Pryor and Buchanan (1984) and Hendry, et al. (1989) used the mock juror 
paradigm for their studies. Landy and Aronson introduced the mock juror paradigm in 
1969. Since its inception it has been used in numerous studies. The mock juror study 
requests that participants cooperate by imagining themselves as a juror. Materials that 
describe a criminal case are then presented to the individual mock juror in various 
formats such as vignettes, videotapes, and audiotapes. The particulars of the case such 
as the characteristics of the accused, the victim, and witnesses or the facts available are 
then varied to assess the effects of these manipulations on the mock jurors decision 
regarding either guilt/innocence or level of punishment. 
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Mazzella and Feingold (1994) comment that mock juror research is often 
considered simplistic and lacking in ecological validity. They make this comment base 
on the premise that the mock juror paradigm often uses brief presentations that may 
inflate the saliency of the manipulation of the extra legal bias. Another criticism is that 
the experimental manipulations of extra legal biases in the mock juror paradigm are 
unduly potent either because judges instructions are omitted (Pfeiffer & Ogloff, 1991) or 
extremely brief scenarios are used that tend to inflate the impact of the extra legal biases 
manipulated (Baumeister and Darley, 1982). In an actual jury situation social interaction 
takes place and has the effect of exposing extra-legal biases to scrutiny thus weakening 
their potency. Weiten and Diamond (1979) found this was the situation and argued it is 
therefore inappropriate to examine the decision of a juror in isolation. Other concerns 
raised regard the fact that whilst entering into the spirit of the mock trial the mock juror 
is not actually making a decision that will result in another person possibly receiving a 
long prison sentence. Furthermore when an actor portrayed a role in courtroom 
simulations were they actually being deceitful as they had not committed a real crime or 
were not committing perjury in the case of the witness. 
In contrast to the findings mentioned above, Kramer and Kerr (1989) were able 
to show that increasing the information provided to mock jurors, and thus reducing the 
saliency of the manipulation of bias, did not reduce effects found for extra-legal bias. 
MaCoun (1990) showed that in balanced cases the effect of extra-legal bias to increase 
mock jurors guilty verdicts was attenuated and provided stronger effects during the jury 
deliberation stage. MaCoun considers that the results of mock juror studies are 
transferred to the actual jury room decision. Hendry, et al. (1989) advised that a study 
with five 6-person juries confirmed the findings of the main study. This study had 30 
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participants, who had not participated in the main study; participants followed the 
procedure for judging the apparently deceptive defendant in the pro-acquittal condition. 
These participants, who formed the five juries, deliberated for up to 45 minutes before 
coming to unanimous verdicts. Four of these five juries voted to convict the accused. As 
with many areas of endeavour it is only by raising and discussing objections that 
improvements can be made. The mock Juror paradigm is a tool that evolves and 
produces additional reliability as these criticisms are addressed. 
A practical development in the reliability of the mock juror paradigm has been 
provided by the use of detailed videotape presentations of trials. As Block ( 1991) points 
out providing detail of a case in a written format is artificial and far withdrawn from the 
reality of a court situation. In the written vignette participants can study the evidence 
presented at their own speed or re-read sections that were originally glossed over but 
later became pertinent. The personality of each of the participants is also missing in the 
written version. Block goes on to consider that a real case is heard only once and the 
materials are presented in a particular order governed by rules of procedure and 
evidence. All parties can be viewed and finally when it comes to the time for decision 
making memory must be relied upon. Block performed a study in England that is not 
really comparable to the two previous studies in that it used experienced magistrates as 
its participants and looked at social attractiveness. However the points raised by Block 
are relevant to the methodology of the mock juror paradigm "For the magistrates who 
acted as respondents, this was as close to the real thing as they could get." (Block, 1991, 
p.23) While having weaknesses it would seem that the mock juror paradigm has been 
improved and when used correctly can provide useful insight into the processes 
contributing to jurors' decisions. 
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The original jury system relied heavily on jurors "saying the truth" regarding the 
credibility of the accused. Modifications to the jury system over the past eight centuries 
have changed this to a situation were modern juror's became "trier's of fact". The legal 
system however still considers that a juror can weigh evidence based on perceptions of 
non-verbal behaviour that indicate deceit. Psychologists showed, through research, that 
people's abilities at identifying deceit from non-verbal behaviour clustered about the 
chance mark. Psychology added concerns regarding extra legal biases. One of these 
concerns was that non-verbal behaviours due to anxiety could be mistaken for deceit and 
innocent people found guilty because of this. Results of studies that addressed this 
concern using demeanour as an extra legal bias are contradictory. Pryor and Buchanan 
( 1984) showed that a demeanour bias worked against a moderately anxious person at the 
balanced level of evidence. Results provided by Hendry, et al. (1989) indicated that a 
demeanour bias would only be found at levels of evidence that favoured acquittal. 
However the previous discussion of the study by Hendry, et al. has indicated that its 
findings might have been compromised by the high saliency given to producing 
deceitful demeanour. 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate whether a person who 
exhibited a nervous anxious demeanour would be considered guilty more often than if 
they had exhibited a calm low anxiety demeanour. Also it sought to ascertain if this bias 
was pervasive and manifested itself at all levels of legally relevant evidence. To this end 
mock jurors were provided with evidence that either favoured acquittal, was balanced, or 
favoured conviction. While this evidence was presented the person accused of the crime 
was shown as exhibiting either a low or moderate level of anxiety. The goal of the 
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demeanour manipulation was to present an innocent person who was either slightly or 
moderately nervous. 
It was predicted that the findings of Pryor and Buchanan (1984) would be 
replicated and that the demeanour bias identified by them would extend to all levels of 
legally admissible evidence. It was therefore anticipated that a main effect would be 
found for demeanour. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 120 members of the general public who were eligible for jury 
duty in Western Australia. There were 69 females and 51 males with an age range from 
18 to 74 (M = 38.76, SD= 13.46, female M = 38.26, SD= 13.89, male M = 39.43, SD 
= 12.97). Participants were recruited by having five people known to the experimenter 
list four people each. These five people were asked to ensure that the people chosen 
were not related, that there were two males and two females, that the people chosen were 
eligible for jury duty in Western Australia and finally that these people were prepared to 
assist and participate in this study. The twenty people chosen in this manner were asked 
to repeat the procedure with the same requirements, however this time they were to find 
five people, three females and two males. Excluding the five acquaintances, this 
produced the required 120 participants with the female to male ratio consistent with the 
juries norm used by Pryor and Buchanan (1984) of approximately 1.3: 1. Two of these 
participants were of Aboriginal decent. 
Participants were then randomly assigned to the experimental conditions. 
Random assignment was achieved by having one hundred and twenty numbers that had 
been allocated to participants placed in a box. As each participants' number was drawn a 
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random number, that came from a table of random numbers and was between 1 and 6, 
was used to allocate the participant to a particular experimental condition. Once a 
condition was full (20 participants) its number was ignored in further draws. The 
participants were truthfully informed that the research was investigating how individual 
jurors made decisions and statements of informed consent were collected prior to 
commencement of the experiment. As soon as the data sheets had been collected 
participants were advised of the manipulation of evidence and demeanour. 
Materials 
In keeping with the recommendation of Block (1991) it was decided that the 
complete trial would be presented using videotape. The 6 videotapes each opened with a 
30 second segment where a full-length view of the accused was shown, whilst charges 
were narrated off the screen. The accused pleaded not guilty at the completion of this 
segment. Pryor and Buchanan (1984) used a black actor to play the role of the accused. 
As previously mentioned many studies have shown that extra legal bias can be based on 
race (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994). To avoid racial bias confounding this study a white 
Australian actor was used. The offence used in this study was that of breaking and 
entering a home and stealing $80 in cash and a computer. No value was placed on the 
computer. Hendry, et al (1989) did not use a crime as previously noted; they used the 
offence of cheating at university make-up examinations. Pryor and Buchanan did use 
breaking and entering however it was not clear in their experiment what, if any thing at 
all, was stolen. 
The strength of legal evidence against the accused was manipulated during the 
narrated section of the videotape. To insure that facial expressions of the narrator could 
not influence the decision of the mock jurors it was decided to leave the screen blue 
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during the narration. In keeping with the study by Pryor and Buchanan (1984) the 
evidence presented was circumstantial and was a matter of identity. That is, could the 
accused be identified as the person who had committed a known crime? Unlike Pryor 
and Buchanan this study contained three different versions of the evidence presented. 
This provided three levels of evidence similar to those used by Hendry, et al (1989). The 
same terms as those used by Hendry, et al were used to identify these manipulations. 
These are pro-conviction, balanced and pro-acquittal. This section contained evidence 
for the prosecution in the form of a witness who saw a car leave the scene of the crime. 
It also included a summary of the evidence from the police officer that had stopped the 
car because it had a broken headlight on the day after the breaking and entering had 
occurred. The officer saw the alleged stolen computer in rear of the car. A summary of 
interviews taken from the staff at the hotel where the accused claimed he had parked his 
car and walked home on the night of the offence. The evidence for the defence consisted 
of an interview of the friend of the accused who had been with the accused at the hotel 
on the night in question. In the next part of the video the examination of the accused 
forms part of the evidence, however the evidence was held consistent during this 
interview. The face and upper torso of the accused were seen on screen whilst the 
accused was being questioned from off the screen. Finally the screen returned to blue 
and the voice of the judge was heard who gave instructions regarding reasonable doubt 
and asked the mock jurors to please retire to make a verdict. At this point the 
presentation ended. 
Manipulation of evidence 
The witness at the scene of the crime reported they had come out of their home 
because they heard an alarm ringing and saw either a brown Holden Kingswood for the 
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pro-acquittal condition or a brown Holden Kingswood with a broken front right 
headlight in the other two conditions. The synopsis of the police evidence is quite 
extensive and the listener needs to absorb and remember a number of facts, however the 
actual difference in the manipulation is that in the pro-acquittal level of evidence 
identification of the computer is not mentioned at all. In the balanced level of evidence 
manipulation the mock jurors are told that the computer found in the car was identified 
as the stolen one. In the pro-conviction level of evidence manipulation the additional 
information that both the stolen computer and the computer found in the car of the 
accused had a long scratch on the right hand side was provided. In the synopsis of police 
evidence all mock jurors heard that the accused claimed that his car was parked at the 
bottle shop of the hotel overnight. The evidence from the hotel staff was manipulated by 
having one member of staff not see the car in the car park in the pro-acquittal level of 
evidence. In both of the other manipulations three of the bar staff had left the hotel 
together via the bottle shop entrance. They had looked around to make sure no one was 
hanging about and had not seen a brown Holden Kingswood parked in the car park. 
Further evidence was manipulated during the examination of the defence 
witness. The witness supported the claim that the car belonging to the accused had been 
left at the hotel on the night in question and that the accused had walked home. This 
same witness claimed that the computer was the property of the accused and that he had 
taken care of the computer during the time the accused was working up north. In the 
pro-conviction and balanced levels of evidence this witness admitted to the prosecution 
that he did not have an alibi for the time of the breaking and entering. The implication 
was that he was the second person the witness at the scene of the crime saw in the car. It 
was intended this implication only be made available to the mock jurors in the 
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pro-conviction and balanced levels of evidence therefore in the pro-acquittal level of 
evidence the witness's wife provided this person with an alibi. No further manipulations 
of evidence were made in either of the periods when demeanour was manipulated. Full 
Transcripts of the evidence presented both in the pilot study and by the narrator are 
provided in appendix A. Verbatim of interviews of the accused as they appeared in the 
videotapes are provided in appendix B. 
It was mentioned when discussing the results of the study by Hendry, et al (1989) 
that they had problems with the manipulation of evidence. In order that similar problems 
be avoided in this study a complete transcript of the proposed videos (appendix A) was 
tested with sixty subjects. ANOVA was performed on the data from this pilot study 
providing a significant result E (2,60) = 143.8, Q <.000, 112 = .835 . Tukey post hoc tests 
confirmed that the difference between all levels of evidence was significant. A 9-point 
scale(l = acquit, 5 = unsure, 9 = convict) had been used and means were M = 6.61, 4.55 
and 2.48 for pro-conviction, balanced and pro-acquittal respectively. 
Mani12ulation of Demeanour 
A major concern that was raised previously regarding the Hendry, et al. (1989) 
study, was that rather than appear truthful the control condition produced a mean 
( M = 6.03) that indicated mock jurors considered the demeanour in the control 
condition to be untruthful. The actor in the control condition of Hendry, et al. maintained 
eye contact for 100% of the time and did not exhibit any self-manipulations or speech 
non-fluencies. By comparison, the actor in the Pryor and Buchanan (1984) study failed 
to make eye contact for 2 seconds and presented 2 self-manipulations and 9 speech non­
fluencies. It was decided that the low anxiety level of demeanour as used by Pryor and 
Buchanan would also be used in this experimental manipulation. 
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For the purpose of this study it was decided to portray an anxious rather than a 
deceptive demeanour. The actor in this study W<ls instructed in these requirements and 
was able to reproduce the demeanour used by Pryor and Buchanan (1984) closely. The 
non-verbal signals of eye contact, self-manipulation and speech non-fluencies are 
considered to be the behaviours used by a perceiver to judge demeanour by both Pryor 
and Buchanan and Hendry, et al. (1989). Eye contact includes behaviours such as rapid 
blinking, rolling eyes upwards or downwards and either closing eyes or looking 
elsewhere so as not to maintain eye contact. Self manipulation includes behaviours such 
as rubbing and squeezing hands, touching parts of the face, scratching or rubbing face or 
other body parts, hand gestures, fidgeting, body rocking and swaying. Speech non 
fluencies take the form of word repetition, stuttering, rapid change in tone of voice, 
hesitation followed by rapid speech, and irregularities such as "urn" and "ahs" as well as 
excessive pausing before answering questions. 
The presentation in this study required 140 seconds for low anxiety condition 
and 164 seconds for the moderate anxiety condition. In the low anxiety condition there 
was 1 self-manipulation compared to 2 for Pryor and Buchanan ( 1984) and I 0 speech 
non-fluencies compared to 9 for Pryor and Buchanan. Eye contact was broken for two 
seconds in both experiments. Eye contact time presented a problem for the actor in this 
study when replicating moderately anxious demeanour. When the actor attempted to 
withdraw eye contact for almost 50% of the time, as was done by Pryor and Buchanan, 
people who viewed the tape including the actor thought he looked sly and devious rather 
than anxious. The fact that Pryor and Buchanan used a black American as their actor 
was a possible explanation for this problem. It was normal for black people in the south 
of the United States to avoid direct eye contact with white people or persons in authority 
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(LaFrance & Mayo, 1976). It was decided that it should be left with the actor to decide 
on the level of eye contact that wouid be used. Whilst Pryor and Buchanan's black 
American actor maintained eye contact only 4-6% of the time in the present study the 
white Australian actor maintained eye contact 86% of the time to achieve a condition 
that Australians recognise as nervous anxiety. The occurrence of self-manipulation to 
produce the moderately anxious demeanour was 26 in this study to 30 in the study by 
Pryor and Buchanan and non-tluencies at 36 in this study to 28 in Pryor and Buchanan. 
A pilot test of the two manipulations of deme::~nour was performed. Twenty participants 
were asked for a single word description of the person on the tape. Those who were 
shown the low anxiety manipulation considered the person to be reasonably calm (8) and 
honest (2). Those shown the high anxiety manipulation considered the person to be 
nervous {9) and dishonest (I). No participants in the pilot study used the word anxious. 
It was decided that in an Australian context the word nervous equated to the word 
anxious and these video segments were used in the study. Verbatim transcripts of the 
manipulation of the two levels of demeanour are provided in appendix B. 
The final section of the video contained the judge's instructions. Gillies (1988) 
advises that for the crime used in the study a judge would normally advise the mock 
jurors regarding reasonable doubt. The following statement was used, "Members of the 
jury it is central to our legal system that you presume the accused is innocent until 
proven guilty. If after taking into account a! the facts presented by the prosecution you 
consider their case proven beyond any reasonable doubt then you must return a guilty 
verdict. If the facts presented by the prosecution do not convince you beyond any 
reasonable doubt then you must return a verdict of not guilty. I would ask that you retire 
from this chamber and consider your verdict". Gillies strongly recommends that no 
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attempt be made to explain the term beyond reasonable doubt to jurors. The components 
produced were then edited onto six different videotapes in keeping with the research 
design. 
A letter was prepared that met the ethical requirements of informed consent. The 
upper part advised participants that the research investigated how individual jurors made 
a decision prior to jury discussion. The letter advised that their participation was entirely 
voluntary and they were free to withdraw at any stage of the study. Participants were 
assured of confidentiality and given contact numbers should they require further 
information. The participant retained this portion. The bottom, tear off, section of the 
letter contained a statement for the participant to sign. The statement -confirmed the 
participant had read the above information and any questions had been answered to their 
satisfaction. Participants acknowledged that they understood they were free to withdraw 
at any time and the data gathered could be published provided it did not identify them. 
This portion was retained and stored separate from the questionnaire. 
An A4 answer sheet was prepared for the collection of data. The front side was 
headed "YOUR VERDICT' and provided two boxes, one marked "Guilty" and one 
marked "Not-Guilty". Below this a vertical scale was provided. The scale was divided 
into three distinct sections each subdivided into tenths. The words "Extremely 
Confident" were placed in line with the top of the scale and th~ words "Not Very 
Confident" at the bottom of the scale. A question placed above this scale asked "Hmv 
confident are you in this verdict?" Immediately below this question was the instruction 
"Please draw a line across the scale at the appropriate place." Questions at the bottom of 
this page asked for details of gender and age. On the reverse side of the sheet at the top 
was printed a scale obtained from the Internet that is used to gather details for evaluation 
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in the affect control theory (Heise, 1979). It is essentially three 9-point categorical 
scales. The mid position is marked neutral. On either side the positions are marked from 
inside to out, slightly, quite, extremely, and infinitely. The top scale was marked "Good 
nice" on the left-hand end and "Bad awful" on the right-hand end. The next scale down 
was marked "Powerless little" on the left-hand end and "Powerful big" on the right-hand 
end. The bottom scale was marked "Slow quiet lifeless" on the left-hand end and "Fast 
noisy lively" on the right-hand end. The question that was placed above the scale read 
"As you are aware we are attempting to understand how individual jurors make 
decisions prior to jury discussion. To help with this would you please mark in the circles 
below how you regard the accused, Mr. Allen." The rest of the page was broken into two 
columns headed "For" and "Against". The question above these columns read "As a 
fmal measure of the individual jurors decision making process could you please note the 
items, both for and against conviction, that you considered in reaching your verdict." 
Research Design 
A 2 x 3 (demeanour x evidence) experimental factorial design was used with two 
levels of demeanour (low anxiety, moderate anxiety) and three levels of evidence (pro-
acquittal, balanced, pro-conviction). The 120 mock juror participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the six experimental conditions. 
Procedure 
Participants were contacted and it was arranged for the study to be performed at 
a number of homes that were central for participants undergoing the same treatment. Up 
to three p!!ople were processed at a time initially, however the majority of participants 
were treated individually in their own homes. The experimenter performed all 
treatments. A friend accompanied the experimenter to ensure that once the experiment 
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had begun it was not interrupted by children, phone calls etc. Before commencement of 
the experiment informed consent was obtained from all participants, as well as their 
permission to use results in any publication. A standard introduction to the experiment 
was used for all participants. This was: 
"Research has shown that jurors often make up their minds before 
they enter the jury room. These jurors are often thought to be 
instrumental in swaying the final decision of a jury (MaCoun, 
1990). This study looks at how individual jurors make decisions. 
Could you piease not discuss the case amongst yourselves until 
today's study is completed (only if more than one participant 
present). In Western Australia jurors are normally not allowed to 
take notes and do not receive transcripts of the proceedings. This 
forces them to rely on memory. To try to replicate this in a 
I 0-minute video we are providing you with a large amount of 
information that you will need to absorb in a short time. The case 
chosen is a difficult one. I will show you the video then ask you 
first to enter your verdict then indicate how confident you are in 
this decision. You are then asked to complete two further 
questions on the rear of the sheet. I will now start the video" 
The participants were then shown one of the six videotapes. When the videotape 
concluded a single A4 sheet containing the dependent variables were distributed. The 
participants Wl!re then asked to enter their verdict of guilty or not guilty by placing a tick 
or a cross in one of the boxes provided on the front page. They were then to complete 
the scale asking "How confident are you in this verdict". The confidence in their verdict 
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scale ranged from not very confident to very confident. Participants then completed the 
questions on the back of the sheet. These sheets were then collected. After ali materials 
were coiiected the participants were de-briefed regarding the manipulation of the 
independent variables, and asked not to discuss the study for at least a month to enable 
ali data to be collected. 
Results 
The study was able to show that a person exhibiting a nervous moderately 
anxious demeanour will be found guilty more often than if they had remained calm and 
exhibited a low anxiety demeanour. This finding applied at all levels of evidence 
presented and mock jurors who considered the accused guilty were the most confident 
about their verdict. This confidence was highest when the evidence presented was pro-
conviction and lowest when the evidence was balanced. The gender of the juror had no 
bearing on these results. 
A preliminary analysis was conducted to establish if there were any effects 
attributable to the gender of participants. This was performed using a log linear analysis 
that contained the variables; gender of participants, verdict, demeanour of the accused, 
and level of evidence provided. No mair; effects or interactions involving gender were 
identified. The data were then collapsed across gender for further analysis. 
A log linear analysis was performed on the dichotomous guilty/not guilty verdicts and 
the independent variables demeanour (low anxiety and moderate anxiety) and level of 
evidence (pro-acquittal, balanced, pro-conviction). Log linear analysis uses a saturated 
model to begin then proceeds through a process of backward elimination until the most 
parsimonious model of best fit is found. This may mean that the process will stop with 
first order interactions or continue through until all possible interactions are eliminated 
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with none proving significant to the model. The saturated model, by default as it 
contains all possible combinations of data, has the best fit and has a probability of I. 
Th'ls the final model needs to contain the least number of interactions as possible and 
·~:.'· 
have a non~significant probability. The closer to I the more robust the model. To 
achieve this aim interactions with a chi-square probability for change greater tha~ .05 
are progressively eliminated until all remaining interactions have a significant 
probability for change if removed from the model (~ < .05). In this study because the 
number of participants exposed to each of the six experimental conditions was held 
constant, at 20, the nUl tiber of guilty verdicts perfectly predicts the corresponding 
number of not guilty verdicts. The analysis for the present study ended with a significant 
overall model ~2 (4. N = 120) = 5.32, ll = .256 indicating the data was a good lit to the 
model. The interactions that remained as significant contributors to the model were 
verdict x evidence LR ~2 (2, N= 120) = 29.2.Jl < .0000), and verdict x demeanour 
LR 1\2 (I, N = 120) = 11.!8.Jl = .0008). Because all variables are entered together these 
constitute main effects for evidence and demeanour. Table 1 gives descriptive statistics. 
The main eft~ct for demeanour when guilty verdicts were recorded showed that the 
accused with a moderately anxious demeanour was found guilty significantly more often 
(!! == 43) than when shown exhibiting a low anxiety demeanour (n = 25). As discussed 
previously because each verdict perfectly predicts the other it follows that the difference 
for not guilty verdicts is significant in the opposite direction. 
Table I 
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Observed guilty/not guilty verdicts at three levels of evidence, (pro-acquittal, balanced, 
pro-conviction) and two levels of demeanour (low anxiety, moderate anxiety}. 
Guilty Verdicts 
Low Anxiety 
Moderate 
Anxiety 
Sub Total 
Pro 
Acquittal 
I 
9 
10 
Not Guilty Verdicts 
Low Anxiety 
Moderate 
Anxiety 
Sub Total 
Total 
Pro 
Acquittal 
19 
11 
30 
40 
Pro 
Balanced Conviction 
9 15 
16 18 
25 33 
Pro 
Balanced Conviction 
II 5 
4 2 
15 7 
40 40 
Goodness of fit Likelihood ratio ~2 (4, N == 120)=5.32, Q= .256. 
% 
25 20.8 
43 35.8 
68 56.6 
% 
35 29.2 
17 35.8 
52 43.4 
120 100 
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Post hoc chi square analyses of levels of evidence revealed a significant 
difference in the relationship between not guilty and guilty verdicts at the two levels of 
evidence, pro-acquittal and balanced "J5..2 (1, n =80) = 11.43, 12 = .0007. As can be seen 
from table 1 a ratio favouring not guilty verdicts (30 to 10) occurred at the pro-acquittal 
level of evidence, while the ratio favouring not guilty verdicts ( 15 to 25) reversed at the 
balanced level of evidence. 
Post hoc chi square analyse of levels of evidence revealed a significant 
difference in the relationship between not guilty and guilty verdicts at the two levels of 
evidence, pro-conviction and balanced "J5..2 (1, n =80) = 4.01, 12 = .045. As can be seen 
from table 1 the greatest ratio favouring guilty verdicts occurred at the pro-conviction 
level of evidence (33 to 7), while a smaller ratio favouring guilty verdicts occurred at the 
balanced level of evidence (25 to 15). 
The results of the post hoc comparisons confirm that the manipulation of level of 
evidence was successful. It is possible that the true balanced level condition, for this set 
of evidence, would have occurred if slightly less evidence had been presented. This is 
confirmed by the high "J5..2 = (1, n = 80) = 11.43, 12 = .0007 result between the pro­
acquittal to balanced manipulation and the lower "J5..2 (1, !! = 80) = 4.01, 12 = .045 between 
the balanced and pro-conviction levels of evidence. It is considered that the 
manipulation of the level of legally admissible evidence was successful in the present 
study. 
A 2 x 3 x 2 (demeanour x evidence x verdict) between subjects ANOVA was 
performed on the confidence expressed by participants in the verdict they had reached. 
The assumptions of ANOVA were deemed to be satisfactory (Levene's ns = .247). Only 
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main effects for level of evidence and verdict prior to discussion were found to be 
significant. Descriptive statistics are given in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Level of confidence in Own verdict at two levels of verdict (guilty, not guilty) and three 
levels of evidence (Pro-acquittal, balanced. pro-conviction). 
Verdict 
Guilty Not guilty Total 
Evidence ll M conf. n M conf. n M conf. 
Pro-acquittal 10 2.24 30 1.86 40 1.95 
Balanced 25 1.89 15 1.56 40 1.76 
Pro-conviction 33 2.26 7 1.72 40 2.17 
Total 68 2.12 52 1.75 120 1.96 
Conf. is level of confidence in verdicc scale scored from 0 to 3. 
Evidence, !:(2, 120) = 3.74, R = .027, ~ 2 = .065 and verdict, E(l, 120) = 11.73, R 
= .001, ll2= .098 both returned significant results as main effects. Post hoc comparison of 
level of evidence was conducted using Tukey HSD test. This revealed that confidence 
was significantly higher at the pro-conviction level of evidence (M = 2.17, SO = 0.63) 
than at the balanced level of evidence (M = 1.76, SO= 0.71 ). No other pairwise 
difference achieved significance. Confidence in verdict was significantly higher when 
the accused was found guilty (M = 2.12, SD = 0.64) than when the accused was found 
not guilty (M = I. 75, SO = 0.67). 
Table 3 
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Level of belief that accused is of good or bad character at two levels of verdict ( guilty. 
not guilty) and two levels of demeanour (low anxiety. moderate anxiety). 
Verdict 
Guilty Not guilty Total 
Deameanour !J M good. !J M good. !J M good. 
Low Anxiety 25 0.52 35 0.89 60 0.73 
Moderate Anxiety 43 -0.37 17 0.35 60 - 0.17 
Total 68 -0.04 52 0.71 120 0.28 
Good is Rating from 4 - good to -4 - bad 
A 2 x 3 x 2 (demeanour x evidence x verdict) between subjects ANOVA was 
performed on the participants rating of whether the accused was of good or bad 
character. The assumptions of ANOV A were deemed to be satisfactory (Levene's ns = 
.119). Only main effects for demeanour of the accused and verdict prior to discussion 
were found to be significant. Descriptive statistics are given in Table 3. Demeanour, 
E(l, 120) ~ 6.32, Jl ~ .013, ~2 ~ .055, and verdict, E(l, 120) ~ 5.13, Jl ~ .025, ~b .045, 
both returned significant main effects. Partkipants considered the accused was of good 
character (M ~ 0. 73, SD ~ 1.26) when he exhibited a low anxiety demeanour. When the 
same accused exhibited a moderately anxious demeanour participants considered he was 
of bad character (M ~- 0.17, SD ~ - 1.45). When participantsretumed a not guilty 
verdict they considered the accused was of good character (M = 0. 71, SD = 1.26) 
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however when returning a guilty verdict this changed towards an opinion of bad 
character (M ~- 0.04, SD ~ -1.47) 
A content analysis of the answers to the open-ended question revealed five 
content items (table 4). This data was analysed using logistic regression. Only the 
description "body language" significantly predicted verdict however it only explained 
2.6% of the variance in verdict. It can be seen from table 4 that thirteen mock jurors 
wrote the term "body language" with no further explanation. Inspection revealed that 12 
of these mock jurors had found the accused guilty and 1 had found the accused not 
guilty. Of the 12 guilty verdicts 2 occurred in the low anxiety demeanour manipulation 
and I 0 occurred in the moderately anxiou::; demeanour manipulation. 
When the accused was portrayed as moderately anxious a similar number of 
mock jurors considered him to be nervous whether they decided he was guilty O!' not 
guilty (7 guilty, 5 not guilty). This indicated that for these mock jurors the manipulation 
of demeanour worked as anticipated. However 2 mock jurors considered the accused to 
be nervous in the not guilty low anxiety condition indicating that these individuals used 
fewer non-verbal cues to establish that the accused had a modf:rately anxious 
demeanour. The low anxiety maniru~ation contained lack of eye contact for 2 seconds, 
I second of self-manipulation and 10 non-fluencies. This low level of non-verbal 
behaviour was able to establish the awareness of nervousness for these two mock jurors. 
Fifteen mock jurors (table 4) considered that the accused exhibited a deceitful 
demeanour, 9 occurred where the mock juror hdd decided upon a guilty verdict in the 
condition where the accused exhibited a moderately anxious demeanour. One other mock 
juror, whose verdict was guilty, indicated that the accused was deceitful in the low 
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anxiety demeanour manipulation. Five individuals (4 in moderate anxiety and I in low 
anxiety) also consider the accused to be deceitful yet found him not guilty. 
Table 4 
Counts of comments regarding demeanour for all participants ordered by verdict and 
level of anxiety. 
Verdict Guilty Not Guilty Total 
Demeanour low moderate low moderate 
No comment 21 17 28 7 74 
Nervous 7 2 5 13 
Deceitful 9 1 4 15 
Calm 1 4 5 
Body Language 2 10 13 
Total 25 43 35 17 120 
Five mock jurors considered that the witness was calm (Table 4) in the low 
anxiety condition (4 of them found him not guilty and I found him guilty). Seventy-four 
mock jurors did not make any comment (table 4) regarding demeanour to the open 
ended question. Of these 49 had been exposed to the accused with a low anxiety 
demeanour while 24 saw a moderate anxiety manipulation. Guilty verdict had been 
recorded by 38 mock jurors and not guilty by 35. The logistic regression performed did 
not indicate a systematic no-comment rate based on verdict. 
Discussion 
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The study was able to show that persons exhibiting a nervous, moderately 
anxious demeanour were found guilty more often than if they remained calm and 
exhibited a low anxiety demeanour. This finding applied at all levels of evidence 
presented and mock jurors who considered the accused guilty were the most confident in 
their verdicts. This confidence was highest when the evidence presented was pro-
conviction and lowest when the evidence was balanced. The gender of the juror had no 
bearing on these results. 
These findings replicated those of Pryor and Buchanan (l884) who found that 
moderately mtxious persons were judged guilty more often than persons who exhibited 
low levels of anxiety, when the evidence presented was balanced. In selecting the 
balanced level of evidence Pryor and Buchanan were guided by their own belief's that 
the ambiguity of the evidence in a balanced condition would enhance effects of non-
verbal behaviour on mock jurors judgements. This study has shown mock jurors were 
least confident in their verdict when evidence presented was balanced however non-
verbal behaviour effected mock jurors judgements across all levels of evidence 
presented. 
The present study raised concerns regarding conviction rates at all levels of 
evidence in the control condition used by Hendry, et al. (1989). When demeanour was 
manipulated convictions increased substantially above those found in a pibt study 
indicating that evidence levels were all being treated as pro-conviction. Hendry, et al. 
found that non-verbal behctviour effected the judgements of mock jurors, but only at the 
pro-acquittal level of evidence. Demeanour was manipulated at two levels. The first 
provided a control condition and the second an apparently deceptive condition. 
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Zuckerman, eta!. (1979) showed that people share indicators of deceit. The study by 
Hendry, et al. provided strong indicators of deceit to mock jurors and did not provide 
judges instructions to counterbalance this. The result was that mock jurors in the control 
demeanour condition provided convictions (M. = 6.13) at a pro-conviction level when the 
evidence presented was pro-acquittal (pilot study M = 3.83 ). In the present study when 
the evidence presented was pro acquittal mock jurors returned I 0 guilty and 30 not 
guilty verdicts being equivalent to a mean of3.33. In the pilot study a 9-point scale was 
used providing a mean (M = 2.32). Both produced conviction~ at pro-acquittal levels. 
Hendry, et a!. ( 1989) provided non-verbal behavioural cues to mock jurors that 
the accused was deceitful. Burgess (1987) identified all the behaviours used in Hendry, 
et al., Pryor and Buchanan (I 984) and the present ~tudy as those that indicate 
nervousness in a public speaker. The present study showed that contextual cues, timing 
and the volume of behaviours were used to provide the various interpretation reached 
by the mock jurors. The expressed aim of the present study was to send cues that the 
accused was nervous. A pilot study using video clips, that showed the interviews with 
the accused, confirmed that participants considered the low anxiety condition calm 
(calm, 8 and honest,2) and the moderate as nervous (nervous, 9 and dishonest, 1). When 
the experiment was performed and comments regarding reasons for verdict analysed this 
balance had changed. Of mock jurors who found the accused not guilty 7 considered him 
nervous, while 5 considered him deceitful. Of those whose verdict was guilty 7 
considered the accused nervous, while 10 considered him deceitful. Within the present 
study these results were not statistically significant, however when compared to the 
results of the pilot study they do indicate that mock jurors mistakenly interpret these 
cues in the context of the trail as indications of deceit. 
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The present study as well as those by Pryor and Buchanan (1984) and Hendry, et 
a!. (1989) were essentially designed to establish whether demeanour bias existed in the 
context of a trial. For this reason these studies do not offer insight into the underlying 
psychological and legal factors that bring about the phenomenon of demeanour bias. The 
present study introduced the ACT theory (Heise, 1997) scale attempting to establish 
whether the moderately anxious demeanour manipulation provided muck jurors with 
evidence of bad character. Had this been the case it would have been argued that 
moderately anxious demeanour constituted evidence of bad character and therefore 
became inadmissible evidence. The scale had been shown to provide different profiles 
for persons who were considered to have different characters. This was not the case in 
the present study where the total scale provided a non-significant result. Analysis of the 
sub-scale good/bad revealed a significant difference for demeanour however analysis of 
the sub-scale powerful/weak and sub-scale fast slow provided non-significant results. A 
strong argument against the bad character hypothesis it that a mock juror will justify 
their verdict by deciding that the accused is of bad character. This alternative hypothesis 
was supported by the data that produced a significant main effect for verdict on the good 
bad sub-scale. 
The video used, whilst not as artificial as using vignettes or as good as the full 
length video produced by Block ( 1991 ), is not the real experience that is provided for a 
juror. For this reason caution must be observed if it is intended to generalise to the legal 
system. The present study was designed to establish that the bias of moderately anxious 
demeanour was real in the mock juror paradigm and existed regardless of the level of 
evidence presented. 
Conclusion 
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Presently this study could not be reproduced using an actual trial due to ethical and 
methodological considerations. If it were shown by future research that a vignette or 
short video could reliably reproduce the findings of a full court then generalisation of 
results from the mock juror paradigm could be made with greater confidence. An issue 
that emerged from the present study regarded the rule that prohibits the introduction of 
evidence of bad character. Future research is needed to define this accurately and 
develop measures that are not susceptible to the justification bias. 
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Appendix A 
Pro-Acquittal Evidence Condition 
{Opens with full length view of accused on screen) 
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Clerk of Courts (off screen) Are you Mr. John Allen of unit 15/175 Harborne Street, 
Glendalough? 
Accused (On Screen) Yes 
Clerk of Courts (Off Screen) You are accused of breaking and entering the premises of Miss 
Joan Myer, a widow with two young children, at 16 Wattle street West Perth on Wednesday 16111 
April at approximately 11.30pm. The home was ransacked and an Apple Macintosh computer, as 
well as $88.00 in cash was stolen. How do you plead? 
Accused (On Sc:"een) Not Guilty 
(Screen goes blue narrator reads as below) 
The accused (Mr Allen) has pleaded "Not guilty". 
Evidence for the prosecution. 
Witness at scene of crime 
Mrs Amelia Jones of 11 Wattle street West Perth came out of her front door at II :30pm on 
Wednesday ]6111 Apri: because she heard an alarm ringing. She saw a brown Holden Kingswood 
come out of number 16 Wattle Street, turn down the road and travel away from her. Mrs. Jones 
immediately phoned the police and reported the incident. 
When questioned further by police Mrs Jones said that she thought there may have been two 
people in the car but from the angle and the distance she could not really be sure. She could not 
say if the driver was male or female. 
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Review and summary of Police Evidence against the accused (Mr Allen) 
Mr Allen was stopped on Thursday 17th April at 8:00pm driving a brown Holden Kingswood 
with a broken right front head light. The officer noticed a computer in t!Je rear of the vehicle. 
The officer realised that the vehicle fitted the description of one seen at the scene of a break and 
enter the previous night, at which an Apple Mac computer had been stolen. The officer first 
asked ifMr Allen was awJ.re that his headlight was not working. Mr Allen replied that he was 
not. The officer then asked where Mr Allen's car had been at 11 :30pm on Wednesday 16th April. 
Mr Allen replied that he had left his car at the Nookenburra Hotel last night, walked home and 
gone straight to bed. When asked if anyone could verify this, his reply was that they could not. 
Mr Allen was asked where at the hotel he had parked his car. Mr Allen replied that it was parked 
by the bottle shop. The officer then asked if it was Mr Allen's computer in the rear of the car. Mr 
Allen replied that it was. The officer enquired when and where the computer was purchased. Mr 
Allen replied "about 2 years ago from a shop in Perth". The officer asked if Mr Allen had a 
receipt for the computer. "I don't think so" replied Mr Allen .The officer asked "where are you 
tP.king the computer now?" Mr Allen replied "I just picked it up from my friend's house, he has 
been looking after it for me while I was working up north". 
When the computer was examined the hard disc had been formatted. A record of the serial 
number had not been available from the stolen computer. 
Evidence from Mr Murphy a neighbour of the accused (Mr Allen). 
Mr Ronald Murphy of unit 5/175 Harborne St, Glendalough left his flat at 11.15pm on 
Wednesday I f.1h April to go to his work as a garage attendant. His parking spot is next to that of 
Mr Allen. Mr Allen's car was not parked in its bay at that time. When Mr Murphy returned 
home from work at 8:30am on Thursday I ih April Mr Allen's car was parked in its bay. Mr 
Murphy does not pass Mr Allen's unit to get to the parking bays. 
Evidence from staff at the Nookcnburra Hotel. 
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Mz Susan Freehand, bar attendant of the Nookenburra Hotel, Liege Street, Woodlands, stated 
that she saw both the accused [Mr. Allen] and his friend Ian [Mr Walters] leave the pub together 
at !0:30pm on Wednesday 161h April. She is sure of this because they were the only people in 
the lounge at the time and she had looked at the clock to see how long she had left of her shift. 
She knows Ian [Mr Walters] because he drinks at the pub regularly. There were a number of cars 
in the car park when Ms Freehand left and she did not notice a brown Holden Kingswood. 
Evidence for the defence. 
Evidence ofMr Ian Walters a close friend of the accused (Mr Allen). 
Mr Ian Walters of 112 Weaponess Road, Scarborough stated that he had been a friend ofMr 
Allen's for many years, They had gone to school together. Mr Walters confirmed that Mr 
Allen's Apple computer had been left with him about 2 years ago when Mr Allen went north to 
work. He [Mr Walters] says that he received a call from Mr Allen on Wednesday 161" April 
around 5pm. Mr Allen advised him that he haj just returned from up north and would like to 
pick up his Apple computer. He [Mr Walters] told Mr Allen that he had some personal stuff on 
the computer that he would have to remove, so it was arranged that he [Mr Walters] would 
format the hard disc, to remove all his information, and Mr Allen would pick it up on Thursday 
l71h April around 7pm. After talking further they mutually decided that Mr Allen would meet 
him at the "Nooky'' [Nookenburra Hotel] that evening for a drink. Mr Walters says that they left 
the pub about I 0:30pm and because Mr Allen thought he would be over the limit Mr Allen left 
his car in the car pnrk and walked home. Mrs Emily Walters confirmed that her husband Ian 
Walters arrived home just before II :OOpm on Wednesday 161h April. 
Examination of the accused (Mr. Allen). 
Q: Where were you on the night of Wednesday 16th April at 11.30pm? 
A: I was home asleep. 
Q: Where were you earlier in the evening? 
A: I was at the Nookenburra pub with my mate Ian Walters. 
Q: How did you get home. 
A: I had enough to put me over the limit so I walked home. 
Q: What time would that have been when you walked home? 
A: About I 0.30 it takes about 20 minutes so I was home before II O'Clock. 
Q: Where was your car. 
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A: I left it at the pub. I normally get up early so I picked it up about 6.15am the next morning. 
Q: Is the computer yours? 
A: Yes 
Q: But the police claim this is the stolen computer! 
A: I can see how they can make that mistake, all Macs look the same. 
Q: Where did you get your computer from? 
A: I bought it a couple of years ago in a shop in Hay Street. 
Q: What was the shop called? 
A: I don't remember. It was at the top end by Milligan Street. I had a look after I was stopped 
but it must hav~ shut down. 
Q: How did you pay for it? 
A: I paid cash for it. I had been working up north and had plenty of money. 
Q: What happened to the receipt? 
A: I went back up north and must have lost it when l was travelling around. 
Q: Why was the computer in your car on the evening that the police stopped you? 
A: I had just picked it up from my friends house. He had been looking after it for me. 
Q: Did you erase the hard drive on the computer? 
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A: No.I rang Ian [Mr WaltersJ the night before I was stopped, Ian said he had stuff on the 
computer and that he would get it ready for me to pick up on Thursday evening. He formatted 
the hard disk. 
Q: Do you own car? 
A: Yes 
Q: What kind of car is it? 
A: A brown Holden Kingswood 
Q: When the police stopped you were you aware that one of your headlights was not working? 
A: No, I just got back to Perth. I drove down from up 11orth a couple of days before. It could 
have broken on the way. I mostly use my spotlights on country trips so I would not have noticed. 
Q: Jn summing up Mr Allen. Who's computer is this? 
A: Mine. 
' . ' 
Balanced Evidence Condition 
(Opens with full length view of accused on screen) 
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Clerk of Courts ( off screen) Are you Mr. John Allen of unit 15/175 Harborne Street, 
Glendalough. 
Accused (On Screen) Yes 
Clerk of Courts (Off Screen) You are accused of breaking and entering the premises of Miss 
Joan Myer a widow with two young children at 16 Wattle Street West Perth on Wednesday 16th 
April at approximately 11.30pm. The home was ransacked and an Apple Macintosh computer as 
well as $88.00 in cash was stolen. How do you plead? 
Accused (On Screen) Not Guilty 
(Screen goes blue narrator reads as below) 
The accused (Mr Allen) has pleaded "Not guilty". 
Evidence for the prosecution. 
Witness at scene of crime 
Mrs Amelia Jones of 11 Wattle street West Perth came out of her front door at 11:30pm on 
Wednesday 161h April because she heard an alarm ringing. She saw a brown Holden Kingswood 
with a broken headlight come out of number 16 Wattle Street, turn down the road and travel 
away from her. Mrs. Jones immediately phoned the police and reported the incident. 
When questioned further by police Mrs Jones said that there were two people in the car, but from 
the distance she could not really be sure if the driver was male or female. 
Review and summary of Police Evidence against the accused (Mr Allen) 
Mr Allen was stopped on Thursday 1 ih April at 8:00pm driving a brown Holden Kingswood 
with a broken right front head light. The officer noticed a computer in the rear of the vehicle. 
The officer realised that the vehicle fitted the description of one seen at the scene of a break and 
enter the previous night, at which an Apple Mac computer had been stolen. The officer first 
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asked ifMr Allen was aware that his headlight was not working. Mr Allen replied that he was 
not. The officer then asked where Mr Allen's car had been at II :30pm on Wednesday 161!' April. 
Mr Allen replied that he had left his car at the Nookenburra Hotel last night, walked home and 
gone straight to bed. When asked if anyone could verity this, his reply was that they could not. 
Mr Allen was asked where at the hotel he had parked his car. Mr Allen replied that it was parked 
by the bottle shop. The officer then asked if it was Mr Allen's computer in the rear of the car. Mr 
Allen replied that it was. The officer enquired when and where the computer was purchased. Mr 
Allen replied "about 2 years ago from a shop in Perth". Th~ officer asked if Mr Allen had a 
receipt for the computer. "I don't think so" replied Mr Allen .The officer asked "where are you 
taking the computer now?" Mr Allen replied "I just picked it up from my friend's house, he has 
been looking after it for me while I was working up north". 
When the computer was examined the hard disc had been formatted. A record of the serial 
number had not been available from the stolen computer. The Apple Mac was positively 
identified as the stolen computer. 
Evidence from Mr Murphy a neighbour of the accused (Mr Allen). 
Mr Ronald Murphy of unit 5/175 Harborne st, Glendalough left his flat at 11.15pm on 
Wednesday !61" April to go to his work as a garage attendant. His parking spot is next to that of 
Mr Allen. Mr Allen's car was not parked in its bay at that time. When Mr Murphy returned 
home from work at 8:30am on Thursday I 1' 11 April Mr Allen's car was parked in its bay. Mr 
Murphy does not pass Mr Allen's unit to get to the parking bays. 
Evidence from staff at the Nookenburra Hotel. 
Mz Susan Freehand, bar attendant of the Nookenburra Hotel, Liege Street, Woodlands, stated 
that she saw both the accused (Mr. Allen] and his friend Ian [Mr Walters] leave the pub together 
at !0:30pm on Wednesday 16111 April. She is sure of this because they were the only people in 
the lounge at the time and she had looked at the clock to see how long she had left of her shift. 
She knows Ian [Mr Walters} because he drinks at the pub regularly. 
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Ms Freehand; Ms Marie Williams and Mr William Fredrick, all employees of the Nookenburre 
Hotel, said that they had [eft the hotei together that night as they norma!ly do through the bottle 
shop entrance. They always look around to make sure no one is hanging abc:.:t. They did not see 
a Brown Holden Kingswood when they left that night. 
Evidence for the defence. 
Evidence of Mr Ian Walters a close friend of the accused (Mr Allen). 
Mr Ian Waiters of 112 Weaponess Road, Scarborough stated that he had been a friend ofMr 
Alien's for m[lny years, They had gone to school together. Mr Walters confirmed that Mr 
Allen's Apple computer had been left with him about 2 years ago when Mr Allen went north to 
work. He [Mr Walters] say3 that he received a call from Mr Allen on Wednesday 16111 April 
around 5pm. Mr Allen advised him that he had just returned from up north and would like to 
pick up his Apple computer. He [Mr Walters] l·•ld Mr Allen that he had some personal stuff on 
the computer that he would have to remove so it was arranged that he [Mr Walters] would 
format the hard disc to remove all his information and Mr Allen would pick it up on Thursday 
17th April around 7pm. Afttlr talking further they mutually decided that Mr Allen would meet 
him at the "Nooky'' [Nookcnburra 1-loteiJ that evening for a drink. Mr Walters says that they left 
the pub about 1 0:30pm and because Mr Allen thought he would be over the limit Mr Allen left 
his car in the car park and walked home. 
When questioned by the prosecution Mr Walters admitted that he did not have anyone who 
could say were he, Mr Walters, was at 11.30pm on Wednesday evening 16111 April. 
Examination of the accused (Mr. Allen). 
Q: Where were you on the night of Wednesday 16th April at I I .30pm? 
A: I was home, asleep. 
Q: Where were you earlier in the evening? 
A I was at the Nookenburra pub with my mate Ian Walters. 
Q: How did you get home. 
A: I had enough to put me over the limit so I walked home. 
Q: What time would that have been when you walked home? 
A: About 1 0.30, it takes about 20 minutes, so I was home before II O'Clock. 
Q: Where was your car. 
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A: I left it at the p•Jb. I normally get up early so I picked it up about 6.15am the next morning. 
Q: Is the computer yours? 
A: Yes 
Q: But the police claim this is the stolen computer! 
A: I can see how they can make that mistake, all Macs look the same. 
Q: Where did you get your computer from? 
A: I bought it a couple of years ago in a shop in Hay Street. 
Q: Wlmt was the shop called? 
A: I don't remember. It was at the top end by Milligan Street. I had a look after I was stopped 
but it must have shui down. 
Q: How did you pay for it? 
A: I paid cash for it. I had been working up north and had plenty of money. 
Q: What happened to the rect:.ipt? 
A: I went back up north and must have lost it when l was travelling around. 
Q: Why was the computer in your car on the evening that the police stopped you? 
A: I had just picked it up from my friends house. He had been looking after it for me. 
Q: Did you erase the hard drive on the computer? 
A: No. I rang Ian [Mr Walters} the night before I was stopped, Ian said he had stuff on the 
computer and that he would get it ready for me to pick up on Thursday evening. He formatted 
the hard disk. 
Q: Do you own car? 
A: Yes 
Q: What kind of car is it? 
A: A brown Holden Kingswood 
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Q: When the police stopped you were you aware that one of your headlights was not working? 
A: No, I just got back to Perth. I druve down from up north a couple of days before. It could 
have broken on the way. I mostly use my spotlights on country trips so I would not have noticed. 
Q: In summing up Mr Allen. Who's computer is this? 
A: Mine. 
Pro~Conviction Evidence manipulation 
(Opens with full length view of accused on screen) 
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Clerk of Courts (off screen) Are you Mr. John Allen of unit 15/175 Harborne Street, 
Glendalough. 
Accused (On Screen) Yes 
Clerk of Courts (Off Screen) You are accused of breaking and entering the premises of Miss 
Joan Myer a widow with two young children at 16 Wattle street West Perth on Wednesday 16111 
April at approximately ll.JOpm. The home was ransacked and an Apple Macintosh computer as 
well as $88.00 in cash was stolen. How do you plead? 
Accused (On Screen) Not Guilty 
(Screen goes blue narrator reads as below) 
The accused (Mr Allen) has pleaded "Not guilty". 
Evidence for the prosecution. 
Witness at scene of crime 
Mrs Amelia Jones of 11 Wattle street West Perth came out of her front door at II :30pm on 
Wednesday 16111 April because she heard an ah,rm ringing. She saw a brown Holden Kingswood 
with a broken headlight come out of number 16 Wattle Street, turn down the road and travel 
away from her. Mrs. Jones immediately phoned the police and reported the incident. 
When questioned further by police Mrs Jones said that there were two people in the car. From 
the distance she could not really be sure if the driver was male or female. 
Review and summary of Police Evidence against the accused (Mr Allen) 
Mr Allen was stopped on Thursday 17111 April at 8:00pm driving a brown Holden Kingswood 
with a broken right front head light. The officer noticed a computer in the rear of the vehicle. 
The officer realised that the vehicle fitted the description of one seen at the scene of a break and 
enter the previous night, at which an Apple Mac computer had been stolen. The offker first 
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asked ifMr Allen was aware that his headlight was not working. Mr Allen replied that he was 
not. The officer then asked where Mr Allen's car had been at I I :30pm on Wednesday 16th April. 
Mr Allen replied that he had left his car at the Nookenburra Hotel last night, walked home and 
gone straight to bed. When asked if anyone could verify this, his reply was that they could not. 
Mr Aile!~ was asked where at the hotel he had parked his car. Mr Allen replied that it was parked 
by the bottle shop. The officer then asked if it was Mr Allen's computer in the rear of the car. Mr 
Allen replied that it was. The officer enquired when and where the computer was purchased. Mr 
Allen replied "about 2 years ago from a shop in Perth". The officer asked ifMr Allen had a 
receipt for the computer. "I don't think so" replied Mr A !len .The officer asked "where are you 
taking the computer now?" Mr Allen replied "!just picked it up from my friend's house, he has 
been looking after it for me while I was working llfl north". 
When the computer was examined the hard disc had been formatted. A record of the serial 
number had not b~en available from the stolen computer. The Apple Mac was positively 
identified as the stolen one. Both the stolen computer and the one found in Mr Allen's 
possession have a long scratch on the right hand side. 
Evidence from Mr Murphy :1 neighbour of the accused (Mr Allen). 
Mr Ronald Murphy of unit 5/175 Harbornc St, Glendalough left his flat at ll.l5pm on 
Wednesday 16th April to go to his work as a garage attendant. His parking spot is next to that of 
Mr Allen. Mr Allen's car was not parked in its bay at that time. When Mr Murphy returned 
home from work at 8:30am on Thursday 17th April Mr Allen's car was parked in its bay. Mr 
Murphy does not pass Mr Allen's unit to get to the parking bays. 
Evidence from staff at the Nookenburra Hotel. 
Mz Susan Freehand, bar attendant of the Nookenburra Hotel, Liege Street, Woodlands, stated 
that she saw both the accused [Mr. Allen] and his friend Ian [Mr Walters] leave the pub together 
at I 0:30pm on Wednesday 161h April. She is sure of this because they were the only people in 
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the lounge at the time and she had looked at the clock to see how long she had left of her shift. 
She knows Ian [Mr Walters] because he drinks at the pub regularly. 
Ms Freehand; Ms Marie Williams and Mr William Fredrick, all employees of the Nookenburre 
Hotel, said that they had left the hotel together that night as they normally do through the bottle 
shop entrance. They always look around to make sure no one is hanging about. They did not sec 
a Brown Holden Kingswood when they left that night. 
Evidence for the defence. 
Evidence of Mr Ian Walters a close friend of the accused (M1· Allen). 
Mr Ian Walters of 112 Weaponess Road, Scarborough stated that he had been a friend of Mr 
Allen's for many years, They had gone to school together. Mr Walters confirmed that Mr 
Allen's Apple computer had been left with him about 2 years ago when Mr Allen went north to 
work. He [Mr Walters] says that he received a call from Mr Allen on Wednesday 16111 April 
around 5pm. Mr Allen advised him that he had just returned ti·om up north and would like to 
pick up his Apple computer. He [Mr Walters] told Mr Allen that he had some personal stuff on 
the computer that he would have to remove so it was arranged chat he [Mr Walters] would 
format the hard disc to remove all his information and Mr Allen would pick it up on Thursday 
17th April around 7pm. After talking further they mutually decided that Mr Allen would meet 
him at the "Nooky" [Nookenburra Hotel] that evening for a drink. Mr Walters says that they left 
the pub about I 0:30pm and because Mr Allen thought he would be over the limit Mr Allen left 
his car in the car park and walked home. 
When questioned by the prosecution Mr Walters admitted that he did not have anyone who 
could say were he, Mr Walters, was at 11.30pm on Wednesday evening 16th April. 
Examination of the accused (Mr. Allen). 
Q: Is your name John Allan 
A: Yes 
Q: Where were you on the night of Wednesday l61h April at ll.30pm? 
A: l was home, asleep. 
Q; Where were you earlier in the evening? 
A: I was at the Nookenburra pub with my mate Ian Walters. 
Q: How did you get home. 
A: I had enough to put me over the limit so I walked home. 
Q: What time would th<H have been when you walked home? 
A; About I 0.30 it takes about 20 minutes so I was home before 11 O'Clock. 
Q: Where was your car. 
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A; !left it at the pub. l normally get up early so I picked it up about 6. 15am the next morning. 
Q: Is the computer yours? 
A: Yes 
Q: But the police claim this is the stolen computer! 
A: I can see how they can make that mistake, all Macs look the same. 
Q; Where did you get your computer from? 
A; I bought it a t.:ouple of years ago in a shop in Hay Street. 
Q: What was the shop called? 
A: I don't remember. It was at the top end by Milligan Street. I had a look after I was stopped 
but it must have shut down. 
Q; How did you pay for it? 
A: I paid cash for it. I had been working up north and had plenty of money. 
Q: What happened to the receipt? 
A: I went back up north and must have lost it when I was travelling around. 
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Q: Why was the computer in your car on the evening that the police stopped you? 
A: I had just picked it up from my friends house. He had been looking after it for me. 
Q: Did you erase the hard drive on the computer? 
A: No.I rang ian [Mr Walters] the night before I was stopped, Ian said he had stuff on the 
computer and that he would get it ready for me to pick up on Thursday evening. He formatted 
the hard disk. 
Q: Do you own car? 
A: Yes 
Q: What kind of car is it? 
A: A brown Holden Kingswood 
Q: When the police stopped you were you aware that one of your headlights was not working? 
A: No, I just got back to Perth. I drove down from up north a couple of days before. It could 
have broken on the way. I mostly use my spotlights on country trips so I would not have noticed. 
Q: In summing up Mr Allen. Who's computer is this? 
A: Mine. 
Appendix B 
Moderately Anxious Demeanour 
Examination of the accused (Mr. Allen). 
Q: Is your name Mr John Allan 
A: Yes 
Q: Where were you on the night of Wednesday 161h April at 11.30pm? 
A: Um, I was home, I was at home asleep. 
Q: Where were you earlier in the evening? 
A: I was at the pub, the Nookenburra pub with my mate Ian Walters. 
Q: How did you get home. 
A: Um, I walked home, I'd had a few to many. 
Q: What time would that have been when you walked hom.:? 
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A: Ah, it would have been about 10.30 its about a 20 minutes to walk, so I'd, so I would have 
been home about II O'Clock. 
Q: Where was your car. 
A: The car? I left it, the car was back at the pub. I'd had a few to many drinks so I decided I'd 
pick it up about 6.15am the next morning. I wake up early so I could pick it up. 
Q: Is the computer yours? 
A: Yes 
Q: But the police claim this is the stolen computer! 
A: Ah well I can see how they can make that mistake, all Macs look the same. 
Q: Where did you get your computer from? 
A: Ahm, I bought my computer from a store in Hay street. 
Q: What was the shop called? 
Trial by anxiety 
58 
A: Ah, ah, I couldn't tell you. It was quite a while ago, I went ba'\:.k to check but it wasn't there, 
so. 
Q: How did you pay for it? 
A: Ah, I paid cash, paid cash for it. 
Q: What happened to the receipt? 
A: I must have lost it when I went back up north, I did a fair bit of travel, so. 
Q: Why was the computer in your car on the evening that the police stopped you? 
A: Urn, the computer was in my car because, ah, my friend Jan, ah, had been looking after it for 
me. Ah, while I, ah, was up North and ah, I called him ah, um, had wme stuff, um, ye, yep, so I 
was picking it ur from him. 
Q: Did you erase the hard drive on the computer? 
A: No. no, no, I didn't, I rang Jan [Mr Walters] to do that, he had stuff on it. He said he'd get it 
ready for me. 
Q: Do you own car? 
A: Yes 
Q: What kind of car is it? 
A: Ah, its a brown Holden Kingswood 
Q: When the police stopped you were you aware that one of your headlights was not working? 
A: Ah, no, no, I wasn't, ah, I mean I had just come down from up North, I'm usually use my 
spotlights on that trip. It must have got damaged. 
Q: In summing up Mr Allen. Whose computer is this? 
A: Ah,mine. 
Low Anxiety Demeanour 
Examination of the accused (Mr. Allen). 
Q: Is your name Mr John Allan 
A: Yes 
Q: Where were you on the night of Wednesday l61h April at I l.30pm? 
A: I was home, asleep. 
Q: Where were you earlier in the evening? 
A: Ah, at the pub, the Nookenburra pub with my mate, ah, Ian Walters. 
Q: How did you get home. 
A: I walked home, urn, I'd had a few to many so I didn't want to drive the car 
Q: What time would that have been when you walked home? 
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A: Ah, it would have been about I 0.30 it takes about 20 minutes to walk so I would have got 
home about 11 O'Clock. 
Q: Where was your car. 
A: The car, um, !left it at the pub. Um, I'd drank a few to many. I woke about 6.15am the next 
morning so I walked down there then. 
Q: Is the computer yours? 
A: Yes 
Q: But the police claim this is the stolen computer! 
A: Ye, but I can see how they can make that mistake, all Macs look the same. 
Q: Where did you get your computer from? 
A: I bought it ah, in, in Perth, in Hay street. 
Q: What was the shop called? 
A: Urn, I'm ;10t sure, I went back after I got back. It's gone, it's not there any more. But it must 
have shut down. 
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A: I paid cash for it. I had been working up north and had plenty of money. 
Q: What happened to the receipt? 
A: The receipt, well I went back up north and probably must have misplaced it up there or 
something. 
Q: Why was the computer in your car on the evening that the police stopped you? 
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A: I was picking it up from Ian's house. He had been looking after it for me, while I was up 
North, um, I was just picking it up again. 
Q: Did you erase the hard drive on the computer? 
A: No. I didn't Ian [Mr Walters] said he um, had some stuff on there, so he just wiped it for me. 
Q: Do you own car? 
A: Yes, I do. 
Q: What kind of car is it? 
A: Ah, a brown Holden Kingswood 
Q: When the police stopped you were you aware that one of your headlights was not working? 
A: No, I wasn't, I'd just come back to Perth actually and on that trip I normally only use my 
spotlights, so I would not have noticed. It probably got broken on the way. 
Q: In summing up Mr Allen. Who's computer is this? 
A: Mine. 
